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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES HARVEY DEITER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 980162-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from conviction for criminal solicitation, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-4-203 (1995), in the First Judicial District Court in 
and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Should the Court consider defendant's claim that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict when he failed to marshal the evidence? Failure 
to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency 
considered on appeal. State v. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.), cert-
denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
2. Did defendant's trial counsel provide ineffective assistance of counsel by 
allowing the admission of defendant's prior criminal convictions? "[W]here the 
ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, [the reviewing] court can 
only determine that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do 
so as a matter of law." State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993) (citations 
omitted). "Because of the 'distorting effects of hindsight/ appellate review of trial 
counsel's performance must be highly deferential in order to prevent the temptation to 
second-guess counsel's actions based on a lifeless record." IcL (citing Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)) (additional citations 
omitted). 
3. Should this Court consider a challenge on appeal to the trial court's 
admission of his prior criminal convictions that trial counsel expressly acquiesced to, is 
unsupported by a plain error argument on appeal, and is inadequately briefed? Failure 
to contemporaneously object and claim plain error on appeal precludes consideration of 
a claim on appeal. Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 131 n.3 (Utah 
App. 1997); State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989) (refusing to consider 
under plain error doctrine trial counsel's conscious refusal to object to evidence not 
constituting ineffective assistance of counsel). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203. Criminal solicitation - Elements. 
(1) An actor commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felony be 
committed, he solicits, requests, commands, offers to hire, or importunes 
another person to engage in specific conduct that under the circumstances 
as the actor believes them to be would be a felony or would cause the 
other person to be a party to the commission of a felony. 
(2) An actor may be convicted under this section only if the solicitation is 
made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the actor's intent that 
the offense be committed. 
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person solicited by the 
actor: 
(a) does not agree to act upon the solicitation; 
(b) does not commit an overt act; 
(c) does not engage in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward the commission of any offense; 
(d) is not criminally responsible for the felony solicited; 
(e) was acquitted, was not prosecuted or convicted, or was 
convicted of a different offense or of a different type or 
degree of offense; or 
(f) is immune from prosecution. 
(4) It is not a defense under this section that the actor: 
(a) belongs to a class of persons that by definition is legally 
incapable of committing the offense in an individual 
capacity; or 
(b) fails to communicate with the person he solicits to 
commit an offense, if the intent of the actor's conduct was to 
effect the communication. 
(5) Nothing in this section prevents an actor who otherwise solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense from being prosecuted and 
convicted as a party to the offense under Section 76-2-202 if the person 
solicited actually commits the offense. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, James Deiter, was charged with criminal solicitation (R. I).1 A jury 
convicted defendant, and the trial court sentenced him to a statutory five-to-life term, to 
be served concurrently with his previous term in the Utah State Prison (R. 119-20). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During January, 1997, Keith Cole ("Cole") was sentenced to fifteen days, to be 
served on weekends, in the Box Elder County jail (R. 133:82). There he met defendant, 
James Deiter, who was also serving time in Box Elder County jail (R. 133:4, 83). 
Sometime during the middle of January, defendant approached Cole, stating that he 
wanted Brent Craven, his parole officer, killed (R. 133:85-86, 88). Defendant told Cole 
that he hated Craven and that he was an "asshole" (R. 133:86).2 As payment for 
1
 At trial, the information was amended, specifying the bases for charging 
solicitation as a first degree felony: "[T]he defendant solicited, requested, offered to 
hire, or importuned one Keith Cole to murder Brent Craven [a Utah parole officer at all 
times relevant] while the defendant was confined in a jail, or the defendant promised 
remuneration or pecuniary gain for the commission of the murder . . . or the victim 
was a parole officer and the proposed homicide was based upon, caused by, or related 
to that official position and the defendant knew that the victim held that official 
position" (R. 1-2; 133:4-5). Craven's murder, under these circumstances, would have 
been a capital offense on three separate grounds. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 
(l)(a), -(g), (k) (Supp. 1998). Hence, solicitation in this case was charged as a first 
degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-204 (1) (1995) ("Criminal solicitation to 
commit a capital felony is a first degree felony.") 
2
 Cole gave a statement to agents which was admitted in evidence, in which 
Cole also reported that defendant considered Craven "a liar and a dope dealer" (Exhibit 
#2, R. 68; 134:132-33). 
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murdering Craven, defendant offered Cole the title and keys to his Harley Davidson 
motorcycle when he saw Craven's obituary in the newspaper (R. 133:85-86)3. Defendant 
also instructed Cole on where to go, how to get a gun from defendant's brother, how to 
commit the murder, and suggested that either a .30-30 or .30-06 would be an appropriate 
weapon (R. 133:85-88). Specifically, defendant instructed Cole to "sit up on top of the 
hill, sit up on the hill with a gun and a silencer on it. As I seen [sic][Craven] walk by a 
window or come out to get in his truck then shoot him" (R. 133:85-86). 
Cole reported this conversation to Craven (R. 133:86; 134:114). Craven works 
for the Department of Corrections and was defendant's parole officer in January, 1997 (R. 
134:113). 
Agents from the Investigations Bureau of the Department of Corrections of Box 
Elder County asked Cole to approach defendant for another conversation (R. 133:87, 
113). Wired so that the conversation could be transmitted and recorded, Cole approached 
defendant and talked with him about the plan to murder Craven, i.e., how to get to 
Craven's house and where he could get a gun (R. 133:87). In response, defendant 
instructed Cole to take the Honeyville Road out to Deweyville, en route to which he could 
not miss Craven's home, to wit: the only one on the left side of the road, in front of which 
3
 Defendant's father, Nelson Deiter, testified at trial that he had physical 
possession of the title and that the motorcycle was pledged to him as collateral from 
defendant (R. 134:176-177). However, the father was not listed as a security holder or 
as having any other interest in the title of the motorcycle (R. 134:179). 
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would be a red four wheel drive Nissan or Datsun with pipes and a camper shell (R. 
133:87-88, 120-21). Defendant also indicated that his brother would provide the gun, 
equipped with a silencer, although defendant had apparently not yet spoken with his 
brother (R. 133:87-88, 121-22).4 
Kyle Kano, an inmate at the Box Elder County jail in January, 1997, overheard 
one of the conversations defendant had with Cole, in which defendant directed Cole to get 
a rifle from defendant's brother's house and then go to Craven's house to shoot him (R. 
134:3-5). Defendant did most of the talking and Cole just listened-the conversation 
seemed serious, without laughter (R. 134:6). Kano also testified that in the two weeks 
prior to defendant's conversation with Cole, he heard rumors from several other inmates 
in the dorm that defendant wanted to kill Craven (R. 134:10-12). 
Agent Mick Spilker's duty was to set up the monitoring equipment in a room 
within the jail and monitor it (R. 134:25-26).5 Agent Spilker testified that he listened to 
the conversation between Cole and defendant while it was being transmitted and recorded 
4
 About a week later, Cole spoke with defendant's brother, Andrew Deiter 
("Andy"), who denied knowing anything about providing a gun, asserted that both Cole 
and defendant were "crazy," and refused to provide a weapon (R. 133:124-25). 
5
 The audio tape recording of defendant's second conversation, State's exhibit 
#5, was admitted into evidence (R. 68; 134:56-57). The parties, supported by the 
testimony of Agents Mick Spilker and Teresa Sargent, acknowledged that the recording 
was not particularly audible (R. 134:56-57, 67-68, 84, 213, 230-31). However, the 
trial judge at sentencing observed that after the trial he met with the jurors, who 
informed him that they had listened carefully to the tape recording and asserted that it 
fully corroborated everything that the agents claimed had occurred (R. 132:19). 
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(R. 134:27).6 He heard Cole approach the defendant and tell him, "I got it all set up" (R. 
134:27-28). When Cole asked defendant for a gun, defendant responded, "All right, I can 
do that. All you need to do is get with my brother Andy" (R. 134:28). He also heard 
defendant provide the specific directions to Craven's house and state the arrangement for 
remunerating Cole with the Harley-Davidson motorcycle as reported by Cole (R. 134:68-
69). The conversation appeared to Agent Spilker, also, to be serious and lasted about 
twenty-five to thirty minutes (R. 134:58, 63). 
Agent Ron Benson testified that during the monitored conversation, he walked 
back and forth from the room where he observed defendant on the video camera to the 
room where he heard on the monitoring equipment defendant speaking to Cole (R. 
134:32, 35-36). Benson further testified that he heard defendant give Cole directions to 
Craven's home and describe Craven's vehicle, which would be parked in front of the 
home, all of which comported with his personal experience of Craven's home (R. 134:33, 
40). He also knew from personal experience that there was a hill across from Craven's 
home (R. 134:40). Agent Benson was certain that the conversation he heard concerned an 
attempt to murder Craven (R. 134:49). 
6
 Although agent Spilker acknowledged that he could not visually observe the 
conversation and could not identify defendant's voice, he noted that Agents Lacey, 
Sargent, and Benson, maintained visual contact of the conversation and informed him 
during the conversation that "contact is made," i.e., that defendant was then talking to 
Cole (R. 134:28-27, 31). Visual contact was established by instructing Cole to stand in 
a specific place so that he and defendant would appear on the video (R. 134:29-30). 
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Agent Teresa Sargent ("Sargent"), who headed the investigation, observing 
through the television monitor and the listening device, heard defendant converse with 
Cole (R. 134:82-83, 98-99). The conversation took place in a room in which there were 
other inmates, from whom defendant and Cole separated themselves in order to converse 
(R. 134:98-99). She testified that the conversation over the live monitor, by which the 
agents listened to the conversation, was much clearer than the recorded conversation (R. 
134:84).7 
Agent Leo Lacey was responsible for putting the body wire on Cole and 
instructing him where to stand within the jail while conversing with defendant (R. 
134:106). Agent Lacey, visually and aurally monitoring part of the conversation, 
identified defendant as the person who spoke to Cole. He also heard defendant give Cole 
specific directions on how to get to Craven's home, which accurately comported with his 
own experience (R. 134:106-07). 
7
 Agent Sargent's notes of her debriefing of Cole following the conversation 
were admitted into evidence as State's exhibit #2 (R. 68; 134:83-85). These indicated 
that defendant gave Cole additional details about how to find his way to Craven's 
house, to wit: on his way to Dewey ville, Cole would pass through Crystal Springs and 
that just on the left side of a church he would find Craven's house, in front of which a 
"root beer brown panel wagon" would be parked; if Cole was unable to find the house, he 
was to ask directions, giving his name as "Michael Myers," if asked (R. 134:215-16). 
Agent Sargent's notes also indicated that defendant reiterated his offer to give Cole title 
to his Harley-Davidson motorcycle when defendant read Craven's obituary, and that in 
response to Cole's inquiry about why defendant wanted Craven shot, defendant replied 
that Craven was a liar, a cheat, a dope dealer, and a junkie (R. 134:216-17). 
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Brent Craven confirmed that at the time of the solicitation he was defendant's 
parole officer and had supervised him for about three years (R. 134:113). 
Armando Solis testified for the defendant. Solis, an inmate in Box Elder County 
jail in January 1997, testified that he was present during the first conversation Cole had 
with defendant (R. 134:149-51). Solis admitted that he and defendant were saying that it 
would be nice to be rid of Craven, who was also his probation officer, but asserted that it 
was only joking barracks talk accompanied by laughter and that it was Cole who 
approached defendant and offered to get rid of Craven (R. 134:152-158). 
Defendant's brother, Andrew Deiter, testified that Cole approached him at his 
home for a gun, but he refused to supply one. Deiter also claimed that in telephone 
conversations with his brother, defendant never asked him to furnish a weapon to 
anybody or indicated a desire to have anybody killed (R. 134:165-70). 
Defendant testified that it was Cole who, in their first conversation, responded to 
Solis's joking suggestion that it would be nice to be rid of Craven (R. 134:186-87) and 
that when Cole offered to get rid of Craven for him defendant refused by stating that "he 
wasn't worth the dirt on my back tireM (R. 134:186-88). Regarding the second 
conversation, defendant testified that Cole approached him about obtaining a gun, that he 
did not know what Cole was talking about but that if he (defendant) needed a gun he 
would get it from his brother, that no mention was made of Craven or of killing anyone, 
and that he never gave Cole directions to Craven's house (R. 134:191-94). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Because the defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's 
verdict, the Court should not consider his insufficiency of evidence claim. See State v. 
Mincv. 838 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Even 
considering defendant's claim, the record contains sufficient evidence "strongly 
corroborating11 defendant's intent to solicit another to commit murder. Four law 
enforcement agents testified to recording and listening with monitoring equipment to 
defendant's second detailed request that another inmate murder his parole officer. The 
tape was played to the jury and fully corroborated the details and seriousness of 
defendant's criminal purpose, as reported not only by the inmate solicited to commit the 
murder, but also by the law enforcement agents. 
POINT II 
Defendant fails to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Defense counsel made a reasonable strategic choice to allow brief and minor 
references to his prior felony convictions, which arguably could not have been excluded. 
Even if counsel was deficient in agreeing to the admission of his prior bad acts, the 
outcome would not have been different. At least one prior bad act requiring committal 
was before the jury, since defendant was an inmate in the county jail at the time of the 
solicitation; references to his convictions were brief; and defense counsel was able to use 
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the convictions to favorably compare defendant to the State's principal witness, who had 
thirteen felony convictions. Most importantly, evidence of defendant's guilt, apart from 
the challenged convictions, was overwhelming. 
POINT III 
This Court should decline to review defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
admission of his prior felony convictions because defense counsel not only did not object 
to the court's admission of those offenses, but rather deliberately acquiesced in the 
admission of the prior convictions. Further, defendant has failed to show that his 
counsel's acquiescence in the admission of the felonies constituted ineffective assistance 
of counsel, has not argued plain error, and has inadequately briefed the real basis of the 
trial court's action, instead arguing a ground wholly unrelated to the trial court's action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE CLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
HAS SUBSTANTIALLY FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILT 
In order to successfully challenge a jury's verdict the reviewing court must find 
that the evidence and inferences based on that evidence so "inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 
11 
443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded bv rule on other grounds. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 
191 (Utah 1987) . In undertaking such review, the appellate court will "view the 
evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, in the light most favorable to 
the verdict." State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah pp. 1990) (citation omitted). 
"[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, [the 
reviewing court] will not disturb them." IJL (citing State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 
345 (Utah 1985)). 
To meet this burden, a defendant must marshal all the evidence in support of the 
verdict and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Failure to so marshal the 
evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of insufficiency considered on 
appeal. Mincv. 838 P.2d at 652 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Moore. 802 P.2d at 738-39); 
West Vallev Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991) 
(adequate marshaling requires "every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists"). 
Defendant first asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he "solicited" 
Cole to murder Brent Craven, his parole officer. Br. of App. at 8.8 In support of his 
8
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203(1) (1995), provides: 
An actor commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felony 
be committed, he solicits, requests, commands, offers to hire, or 
importunes another person to engage in specific conduct that under the 
circumstances as the actor believes them to be would be a felony or would 
12 
claim, defendant states only that the State's evidence showed that (1) in his first 
meeting defendant allegedly requested Cole murder Craven in return for a Harley-
Davidson motorcycle, but that the "solicitation" was only "jokingly" made, and (2) 
agents listening to the monitored conversation heard defendant ask Cole to murder 
Craven, provide Cole with directions to Craven's house, and discuss how Cole could 
obtain a gun from defendant's brother's and, thereafter, the motorcycle. Br. of App. 
at 8. While it is patent that even this sketch of the State's evidence is sufficient to 
prove "solicitation," defendant not only failed to marshal this same class evidence with 
the same persuasive specificity with which it was presented at trial (highlighted), but 
also omitted crucial facts (highlighted): 
(1) Cole testified: 
- Having expressed extreme dislike for Craven, defendant approached 
Cole in an effort to solicit him to murder Craven (R. 133:85-88); 
- Defendant gave Cole detailed instructions on how to find Craven's 
house, how to obtain a gun, and where to position himself in order 
to murder Craven (R. 133:85-88); 
- Defendant told Cole that as soon as he saw Craven's obituary in the 
paper he would give Cole the title and keys to his Harley-Davidson 
motorcycle (R. 133:86); 
- Defendant specifically described the weapon which would be 
appropriate for the murder (R. 133:87). 
cause the other person to be a party to the commission of a felony. 
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(2) Kano testified: 
- He overheard defendant direct Cole to get a gun from defendant's 
brother's house and then go to Craven's house and shoot 
him (R. 134:3-5); 
- During the conversation, defendant did most of the talking and Cole 
just listened-the conversation seemed serious, without 
laughter (R. 134:6); 
- He heard rumors in the dorm from other inmates during several weeks 
prior to defendant's conversation that defendant wanted to kill 
Craven (R. 134:10-11). 
(3) Agent Spilker testified: 
- He heard, through the listening device, Cole tell defendant that he had it 
"all set up" and stated that he needed a gun to which defendant 
answered "All right, I can do that. All you need to do is get with 
my brother Andy" (R. 134:28); 
- He also heard defendant provide specific directions to Craven's house 
and state the arrangement for rewarding Cole with his 
motorcycle (R. 134:68-69); 
- The conversation appeared serious to him (R. 134:58). 
(4) Agent Benson testified: 
- He heard, through the listening device, defendant give Cole specific, 
accurate directions to Craven's home, further identified 
by specific vehicles which would be located 
outside the residence (R. 134:33, 40); 
- He heard defendant accurately describe the hill by Craven's home 
(R. 134:40); 
- He was certain that the conversation concerned an attempt to murder 
Craven (R. 134:49). 
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(5) Agent Lacy testified: 
- He heard, through the listening device, defendant give accurate 
instructions to Craven's home (R. 134:106-07). 
(6) Agent Sargent's notes made in debriefing Cole immediately after his 
conversation with defendant (admitted as State's, Exhibit #2) described 
in detail the directions defendant gave Cole to reach Craven's house, the 
offer to reward Cole with the motorcycle after Craven was shot, and the 
basis for defendant's wanting Craven shot (R. 134:68; 134:83-85, 
215-17). 
(7) The audio tape recording of defendant's conversation with Cole 
(admitted as State's Exhibit if5) was played to the jury and confirmed 
everything the agents claimed they heard on the monitor (R. 68; 132:19; 
134:56-57, 182). 
The foregoing evidence is plainly sufficient to support the jury determination that 
defendant "solicited" Cole to murder Craven. 
Defendant also argues that because he did not "make some effort to initiate his 
plan," i.e., Cole was unable to obtain a gun from his brother, Andy, who appeared 
entirely ignorant and dismayed by a plan to kill anybody, the State failed to prove the 
existence of circumstances that "strongly corroborated" the defendant's intent to solicit 
Craven's murder. Br. App. 9.9 However, although defendant appears to acknowledge 
that proof of criminal solicitation does not require a showing of an overt act or a 
substantial step towards the commission of the offense, or that the solicited act was not 
completed, see Br. of App. at 10, defendant's argument belies his acknowledgment. 
9
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203(2) (1995) provides: "An actor may be convicted 
under this section only if the solicitation is made under circumstances strongly 
corroborative of the actor's intent that the offense be committed." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203(3) (1995), provides, in pertinent part: 
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person solicited by the 
actor: 
(a) does not agree to act upon the solicitation; 
(b) does not commit an overt act; 
(c) does not engage in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward the commission of any offense[.] 
Further, the general rule is that solicitation is accomplished even when there is 
no further action by any party to the solicitation. "The crime of solicitation is complete 
when the communication is made with the intent that the other person engage in the 
unlawful conduct. It is not necessary for the People to prove that any overt steps were 
taken to effectuate the underlying crimes." People v. Cheatham. 658 N.Y.S. 2d 84, 85 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997). See also People v. Lubow. 272 A.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. 1971) 
(the gravamen of criminal solicitation is the communication to another to engage in 
unlawful activity, without the requirement that anything further be done); State v. 
Casteneda, 642 P.2d 1129, 1138 (N.M. 1982) (same, and noting "[t]he thrust of the 
[solicitation] statute is not only prevention of the harm that would result should the 
inducements prove successful, but also protection of citizens from exposure to 
inducements to commit or join in the commission of felonies."); People v. Breton. 603 
N.E.2d 1290, 1295 (111. Ct. App. 1992) (distinguishing conspiracy, which requires an 
agreement and an overt act, from solicitation, which "involves an attempt to persuade 
another to commit a crime"). 
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Further, although no Utah case has interpreted the scope of the term "strongly 
corroborative," other states, applying statutes having the same operative language as 
section 76-4-203(2), have found evidence sufficient to support a solicitation conviction 
where the defendant undertook no greater preparation than defendant in this case. 
See People v. Washington. 865 P.2d 145, 148-49 (Colo. 1994) (under Colorado's 
criminal solicitation statute requiring "circumstances strongly corroborative of [] 
intent," the defendant's offer to sell crack cocaine to undercover police officer, giving 
of his phone number and street name to undercover officer for the purpose of 
conducting drug transactions, telling undercover officer that he previously distributed 
drugs for a major gang, and telling undercover officer to call him in order to execute 
proposed drug deal held to "amply corroborate[] the defendant's stated intent to induce 
[undercover officer] to purchase crack cocaine from him"); Varvaro v. State. 772 
S.W.2d 140, 143-44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (under Texas criminal solicitation statute 
requiring "circumstances strongly corroborative of both the solicitation itself and the 
actor's intent the other person act on the solicitation," tape recording of oral solicitation 
to commit murder played for jury and admitted into evidence alone provided sufficient 
corroboration); State v. Jovanovic. 416 A.2d 961, 964-65 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1980) 
(where elements of attempt embraced solicitation to commit arson and required "that 
the substantial steps taken must be strongly corroborative of defendant's criminal 
purpose," defendant's pointing out to undercover detective the type of construction and 
17 
layout of the building and assuring detective that the tenants would be safe, even though 
the defendant was arrested before he obtained insurance on the building or made 
payment to the detective, held to be sufficiently corroborative). 
Defendant fully accomplished criminal solicitation when he approached Cole and 
offered him his Harley Davidson as payment for murdering Craven. As outlined 
above, the record evidence amply depicts circumstances strongly corroborative of 
defendant's intent to solicit Cole to murder Craven. The assertion that defendant's 
brother did not know of the gun or that defendant did not contact his brother about the 
gun is irrelevant. In sum, because defendant failed to marshal the evidence abundantly 
supporting the jury's verdict, this Court should decline to consider his claim that the 
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for criminal solicitation. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT HIS COUNSEL 
PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY OR THAT ANY ALLEGED 
DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE WAS PREJUDICIAL 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not 
objecting to the admission of his felony convictions. Br. of App. at 11. However, 
because defendant fails to show that his counsel's acquiescence in the cursory reference 
to the felonies constituted deficient performance or was prejudicial, his claim fails.10 
10
 Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to procure in 
discovery a tape recording of Cole's attempt to obtain a gun from his brother, Andrew 
Deiter. Br. of App. at 11-12. The Court need not consider this claim. Defendant 
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A. The Standard of Review. 
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must 
show that counsel's performance was deficient by identifying specific acts or omissions 
which, under the circumstances of the particular case, demonstrate that,,v counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Templin. 
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). Second, defendant must establish the prejudice prong 
by "affirmatively show[ing] that a reasonable probability exists that except for 
ineffective counsel, the result would have been different." State v. LovelL 758 P.2d 
909, 913 (Utah 1988). "Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that counsel's 
'performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,' 
and that counsel's actions were not conscious trial strategy." State v. Ellifritz, 835 
P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992)(citation omitted). 
provides no citation to the record indicating the existence or content of the alleged tape, 
the record does indicate that there is such a tape, and no such tape has been made part 
of the record on appeal. Thus, at the very least, defendant cannot show that he was 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to obtain the phantom tape. See State v. Huggins. 
920 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah App. 1996) (defendant bears the burden of affirmatively 
show[ing] that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the 
result would have been different). See also "When a defendant predicates error to [an 
appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an 
adequate record." State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied. 
460 U.S. 1044, 103 S. Ct. 1443 (1983). 
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Defendant's burden is heavy: 
In proving the first prong of the Strickland test, the 
defendant must point to specific instances in the record 
where counsel's assistance was inadequate. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. In so doing, the defendant 
must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance," Id, at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. "This court will 
not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, 
however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect." 
fState v.1 Tennvson. 850 P.2d [461], 465 [(Utah App. 
1993)] (citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 
2065; State v. PascuaL 804 P.2d 553, 556 (Utah App. 
1991)). 
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). See Tennyson. 850 P.2d at 468 
(noting that given Strickland's strong presumption of competence, "we need only 
articulate some plausible strategic explanation for counsel's behavior"). 
B. Defense Counsel Reasonably Chose to Allow Minimal 
References to Defendant's Prior Felony Convictions, 
Defense counsel impeached inmates testifying for the State with their felony 
convictions. In cross examining Kano, he immediately focused on the inmate's two 
forgery convictions and robbery conviction, eliciting that Kano was then in jail as a 
result of those convictions (R. 134:7-9). In examining Cole, the State's principal 
witness, defense counsel was able to develop, at length, the details of Cole's nine 
forgery convictions, two robbery convictions and a burglary conviction, that all of the 
crimes involved dishonesty and moral turpitude, that he had served time in prison as a 
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result of his prior convictions, that he had not been entirely rehabilitated, that at time of 
this incident he was serving time on one of the forgery convictions, and that as a result 
of his disclosure of defendant's alleged solicitation he had apparently been relieved of 
the remainder of his fifteen day sentence (R. 133: 91-97). 
At the close of the State's case, the prosecutor asked that if defendant testified 
that he be allowed to elicit only that defendant had been convicted of certain felonies, 
without further discussion (R. 134:140). The rationale for this request was that, in 
view of defense counsel's lengthy exposition of the State's witnesses' felony records, 
the jury would be somewhat confused if defendant's felonies were not also mentioned 
(R. 134:140). Although not stated, the implicit basis of this request was that because 
the State's inmate witnesses had been substantially impeached on their prior felonies, 
the State should be entitled to make at least minimal reference to defendant's prior 
felonies. Implicit also was that any prejudice connected with these references was 
mitigated by the obvious fact that, since defendant was in jail at the time he solicited 
Cole to murder Craven, defendant had already been convicted and committed of at least 
one offense when he approached Cole. 
Defense counsel responded to the prosecutor's request, saying, "I think he's 
entitled to that." At the same time, counsel alerted the court that the admission of 
defendant's prior bad acts was potentially prejudicial in a way not applicable to 
witnesses under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, and that the prosecution should not 
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be allowed to delve into defendant's prior felonies to the same extent he had with the 
State's witnesses (R. 134:141). The trial court agreed, and the prosecutor asserted that 
he would only identify the convictions and their degree (R. 134:141).n The apparent 
basis of the trial court's acquiescence in the parties' agreement to allow admission of 
defendant's prior felonies was that the admission was obviously some kind of quid pro 
quo for defendant's lengthy impeachment of the State's witnesses, i.e. effectively a 
ruling bearing on witness credibility under rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence.12 
As soon as defendant took the stand, defense counsel had defendant acknowledge 
his felony convictions for evading a police officer, possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person, and possession of a dangerous weapon, to wit: a bow and arrow, by a 
restricted person (R. 134:183). On cross examination, the prosecutor elicited that the 
evasion conviction was entered in 1991, that the possession of dangerous weapons 
11
 The parties' discussion and the court's ruling are attached at Addendum A. 
12
 Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides, in part: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable 
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under 
which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been 
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
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convictions were entered at the end of 1996, and that a conviction for assault by a 
prisoner was entered in January, 1992 (R. 134:198-99). 
In these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that defense counsel believed 
that if he objected to the prosecutor's modest proposal to only minimally refer to 
defendant's prior felonies, he might then have been faced with a more substantial 
challenge, to wit: that defendant's prior convictions should be admitted to impeach his 
credibility under rule 609 (a)(1). Ct State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989) 
(reasonable trial strategy to refrain from attempting to exclude arguably inadmissible 
child testimony, but which counsel could reasonably conclude would be admitted). 
Indeed, there is some evidence that defense counsel's modest concession evoked a 
similar response from the prosecutor, when shortly afterward the prosecutor abandoned 
his objection that there was improper foundation for defendant's asserting that Cole had 
actually gone to defendant's brother's house to obtain a gun (R. 134:167-68). 
Moreover, it is reasonable that defense counsel recognized that, since the jury already 
must have recognized that defendant had been convicted of some crime, reference to 
other criminal acts not involving dishonesty would not be very damaging and would 
provide a basis for favorably comparing him with the State's principal witnesses, who 
had been repeatedly convicted of crimes involving dishonesty. Indeed, counsel 
employed this tactic in closing (R. 134:240). 
Finally, defense counsel expressly affirmed the State's entitlement to minimally 
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reference the prior convictions, cautioned the trial court that the prosecutor could not 
delve into defendant's convictions to the same extent that defense counsel had with the 
State's inmate witnesses, and alerted the trial court to danger of prejudice under rule 
403, if the prosecution referred more than minimally to his prior conviction (R. 
134:141). These considerations strongly indicate that counsel was also aware of the 
relevant case law pertaining to rule 609, which was the apparent basis for the trial 
court's agreeing to admit defendant's prior convictions. See State v. Tucker. 800 P.2d 
819, 822 (Utah App. 1990) ("[Generally, a rule 609(a) inquiry should be limited to the 
nature of the crime, the date of the conviction and the punishment."). Thus, it is plain 
that defense counsel's acquiescence in the admission of defendant's prior felonies was 
conscious and not the result of neglect or inadvertence. 
Cm Even if Defense Counsel was Deficient in Allowing Admission 
of Defendant's Prior Felony Convictions, there was No 
Reasonable Likelihood of a Different Outcome, 
However, even if defense counsel was deficient in agreeing to admit defendant's 
prior felony convictions, defendant has failed to show that, absent this deficient 
performance the trial result would have been different. First, defendant's incarceration 
at the time of his solicitation was notice to the jury that defendant was guilty of some 
prior bad act, thus mitigating any prejudice associated with minimal reference to 
defendant's other convictions. Second, defendant's character for dishonesty and 
unreliability became evident when, instead of a simple loan, his father testified that in 
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order to pay his son's legal bills he took a security interest in the motorcycle 
(R. 134:175, 177). Third, the prosecutor's reference to the felonies was minimal (R. 
134:198-99) and not referenced in closing argument. Fourth, defense counsel not only 
was able to blunt the prosecutor's reference to defendant's convictions by having 
defendant immediately acknowledge them, he was also able to affirmatively use them 
by arguing in closing that his felony record was trivial compared with Cole's (R. 
134:240). Finally, as discussed at Point I, the evidence of defendant's guilt was 
overwhelming. In sum, defendant has failed to show that, but for his counsel's alleged 
ineffective assistance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF HIS 
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS, WHICH, IN ANY CASE, WAS 
HARMLESS 
A. Defendant's Multiple Procedural Failures on 
Appeal Preclude Appellate Review, 
"As the Utah appellate courts have reiterated many times, we generally will not 
consider an issue, even a constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for the 
first time." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). "The purpose of 
requiring a properly presented objection is to 'put[] the judge on notice of the asserted 
error and allow the opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the 
proceeding.'" State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations 
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omitted). "[The contemporaneous objection] rule applies unless defendant can on 
appeal establish plain error or the existence of exceptional circumstances to excuse 
defendant's failure to preserve the issue at the trial court level." State v. Schweitzer. 
943 P.2d 649, 654 n.3 (Utah App. 1997). However, where the appellant "makes no 
effort to meet the requirements of the plain error exception by showing (1) an error 
exists, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is 
harmful," the appellate court will decline to address the appellant's claim. Hart v. Salt 
Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 131 n.3 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Irwin. 
924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied. 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997)). See State v. 
Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 (Utah 1993) ("If any one of these requirements is not met, 
plain error is not established."). Moreover, the reviewing court will decline to review 
a ruling under the plain error doctrine "if a party through counsel has made a conscious 
decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into error." Bullock. 791 
P.2d at 158. Elaborating on its refusal to consider defendant's plain error argument, 
the Bullock court stated: 
If the decision [not to object] was conscious and did not amount to 
ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should refuse to consider the 
merits of the trial court's ruling. Indeed, the failure to object in such 
instances should be treated as a conscious waiver and should preclude 
further consideration of the issue. 
The plain error rule exists to permit review of trial court rulings as 
26 
a way of protecting a defendant from the harm that can be caused by 
less-than-perfect counsel. But the purpose of that rule is in no way 
implicated if defense counsel consciously elects to permit evidence to be 
admitted as part of a defense strategy rather than through inadvertence or 
neglect. 
IdL at 159 (citations omitted). 
At trial, defendant not only failed to object to the admission of his prior felony 
convictions, he also positively affirmed that they should be admitted (R. 134:141), an 
obviously conscious trial tactic undertaken neither inadvertently nor neglectfully and 
which defendant has failed to show amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. See 
State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Utah 1987) (refusing to address challenge to 
jury instructions defense counsel positively affirmed); State v. Betha. 957 P.2d 611, 
617 (Utah App. 1998) (challenging trial court's limited discussion of prior crimes under 
rule 609 held to be invited error where the defendant successfully urged the trial court 
to impose those limitations). On appeal defendant has not even argued that the trial 
court's action was erroneous under the plain error doctrine. Therefore, this Court 
should decline to consider defendant's claim on the merits. 
Furthermore, tf'[a] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined 
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Snyder. 932 P.2d 
120, 130 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)). 
Utah courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not be 
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addressed on appeal. See State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) 
(disregarding arguments not adequately supported by legal analysis or authority); State 
v. Herrera. 895 P.2d 359, 368 n. 5 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address defendant's state 
due process argument where argument entailed only superficial statement concerning 
Utah's unique history and reference to another part of defendant's brief). See also Utah. 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."). 
As outlined at Point II of this brief, the trial court apparently allowed admission 
of defendant's prior felonies under rule 609. It is impossible to construe the State's 
request for the admission of defendant's prior felonies, and consequently the court's 
acquiescence, as a motion and order under rule 404(b), since the State's request was 
plainly related to the impeaching effect of prior convictions, rather than any relevance 
those convictions might have in proving some element of the solicitation offense.13 
Notwithstanding the trial court's apparent acquiescence in allowing defendant's 
13
 Compare Utah R. Evid 404(b) ("[EJvidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of 
rules 402 and 403."), with Utah R. Evid 609(a) ("For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness . . . . " ) (emphasis added). Moreover, it would appear that 
defendant's prior felonies, to wit: evading an officer, possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person, and assault by a prisoner, are insufficiently similar to solicitation 
to commit murder to be admitted under rule 404(b) to show intent, and the prosecutor 
made no attempt to show any similarity (R. 134:140). 
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prior felonies to be admitted under rule 609, defendant argues almost exclusively that 
the trial court erred under rule 404(b) in admitting his prior felonies. Only at the 
conclusion of his argument does he devote a brief paragraph to rule 609. Br. of App. 
at 17. There he argues that his prior convictions are also inadmissible under rule 609 
because none of them are crimes of dishonesty. However, the prosecution never 
asserted, nor did the trial court rule, that any of defendant's prior convictions were 
crimes of dishonesty. Rather, the parties acknowledged that they were simply felonies 
(R. 134:140-41). See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986) (all felonies, 
including those not involving dishonesty or false statement, are admissible under rule 
609(a)(1), if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect). Thus, 
even with respect to rule 609, defendant has argued error on a ground the trial court 
never adopted. Moreover, defendant has failed to provide any meaningful analysis or 
authority for testing whether his prior offenses were admissible under rule 609.14 
In sum, because defendant (1) did not object to the trial court's admission of his 
prior felony convictions and has failed to argue that the admission of his prior felonies 
14
 See Banner. 717 P.2d at 1334 (providing factors to be considered when 
balancing the probative value of prior offenses against their prejudicial effect: "the 
nature of the crime, as bearing on the character for veracity of the witness; the 
recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction; the similarity of the prior crime to the 
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to punish the accused 
as a bad person; the importance of credibility issues in determining the truth in a 
prosecution tried without decisive nontestimonial evidence; [and] the importance of the 
accused's testimony, as perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions probative of 
the accused's character of veracity.") (citation omitted). 
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was plain error, (2) has attacked the admission of his prior convictions on a ground 
unrelated to the trial court's ruling, and (3) failed to adequately brief a legal argument 
related to the court's actual basis for admitting the prior offenses, this Court should 
decline to consider his claim on appeal. Even assuming this Court were to analyze 
defendant's claim under the plain error rule and find the trial court had erred in 
admitting defendant's prior felony convictions, the error was harmless in light of all the 
reasons set out at Point IIC of this brief. See State v. Brown. 771 P.2d 1093, 1095 
(Utah App. 1989) (error in admitting evidence under rule 609 harmless where evidence 
of guilt was overwhelming). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that 
defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion be issued. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this XI day of May, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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1 MR. BARON: There's one other matter that I would like 
2 to address before I rest. In case Mr. Deiter takes the 
3 stand, I have received certified copies of the various 
4 crimes that Mr. Deiter has been convicted of here in Utah. 
5 We've got illegal possession of a dangerous weapon, two 
6 counts. Assault by a prisoner, one count. 
7 THE COURT: Are those all felonies? 
8 MR. BARON: They are. And failure to stop at the 
9 command of a peace officer. So we have four felonies that 
10 he's had in Utah. Originally we had talked about just 
11 saying he's been convicted of four felonies. The problem I 
12 have at this point is counsel for the defendant has gone to 
13 great lengths on my witnesses going over what their 
14 felonies were, exactly what they were convicted of and so 
15 on. 
16 What I propose, I think if I just say convicted 
17 of four felonies and leave it at that the jury will say how 
18 come they brought up about all of these other people's 
19 felonies and nothing about his. I won't mention the 
20 Pennsylvania murder one. I realized we are trying to avoid 
21 that. I'll just bring these up and ask him how many 
22 felonies he's been convicted of and go through the same 
23 litany, when were you convicted of it and what was it and 
24 then leave it at that. Otherwise I think the jury is left 
25 wondering. 
Volume 2 - Page 14 0 
THE COURT: Counsel. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I think hefs entitled to do that. 
THE COURT: All right. The concern we all had 
originally was the poisoning effect of the first 
conviction. If you don't touch that, it sounds like 
Mr. Knowlton won't object to the other four. 
MR. BARON: I think the court ruled that to mention 
what that is would be improper. He's got four here. I 
don't see that it would hurt to mention those and not the 
other one. 
MR. KNOWLTON: You have to remind yourself, Judge, 
that this is the defendant, not just a witness. 403 
applies in the balance. 
THE COURT: Understood. And if you don't object it's 
resolved. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I'm not sure he's entitled to go into 
the same length I did. 
THE COURT: He isn't. These were witnesses and they 
were offenses involving dishonesty, which are a little 
different class. 
MR. BARON: I'll just identify them as crimes, when 
they occurred and that he was convicted of them and what 
degree they were. 
THE COURT: All right. If there's no objection, we'1 
handle it in that manner. Anything else? 
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MR. KNOWLTON: I don't think so. Have you rested? 
MR. BARON: Not yet, but I was going to. 
THE COURT: We111 have you do that in front of the 
jury. If you would like, I'll give you about a three or 
four minute recess and then bring the jury in to start. 
MR. KNOWLTON: I wanted to make a motion to dismiss. 
THE COURT: Maybe we should do that right now. 
MR. BARON: For the record, over the lunch hour I have 
reviewed the information that charges the offense. In 
looking at that information and reviewing the witnesses 
that have testified and the evidence, the State feels like 
for our case in chief we have established the charge and we 
would rest. 
MR. KNOWLTON: If it please the court, the State 
having rested, the defense would move at this time to 
dismiss the information charging the is defendant, James 
Deiter, with criminal solicitation, a felony of the first 
degree. We do that based upon the statute, 76-4-203. If 
you look at that statute, it kind of comes together with 
the scheme with a couple of other things. That's the 
attempt statute and then the criminal conspiracy statute. 
If you look at the attempt, for example, you see 
the legislative intent there is to say that these offenses 
can be prosecuted where there's an attempt to commit an 
underlying offense, or there is a substantial step made to 
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